Advances in Manufacturing ›› 2014, Vol. 2 ›› Issue (2): 150-157.doi: 10.1007/s40436-014-0072-3

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Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing

Xue-Hua Sun1 • Xue-Jian Chu2 • Zhong-Dai Wu3   

  1. 1.Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mechanical Automation and Robotics, Shanghai University, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China
    2. Modern Logistics Research Center, Shanghai University, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China 
    3. China Shipping Information System Co., Ltd, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China 
  • 收稿日期:2014-01-31 修回日期:2014-04-09 出版日期:2014-06-28 发布日期:2014-05-27
  • 通讯作者: e-mail: sunxuehua795@126.com

Incentive regulation of banks on third party logistics enterprises in principal-agent-based inventory financing

Xue-Hua Sun1 • Xue-Jian Chu2 • Zhong-Dai Wu3   

  1. 1.Shanghai Key Laboratory of Mechanical Automation and Robotics, Shanghai University, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China
    2. Modern Logistics Research Center, Shanghai University, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China 
    3. China Shipping Information System Co., Ltd, Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China 
  • Received:2014-01-31 Revised:2014-04-09 Online:2014-06-28 Published:2014-05-27
  • Contact: e-mail: sunxuehua795@126.com

摘要: In inventory financing, asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks, often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem, a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory. By comparison, it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions, and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions. The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

关键词: Inventory financing ,  Asymmetric information ,  Principal-agent ,  Regulatory incentive

Abstract: In inventory financing, asymmetric information between banks and the third party logistics enterprises may incur moral risks, often causing economic losses of banks.To effectively solve this problem, a pure incentive scheme and a regulatory incentive scheme are designed with the principal-agent theory. By comparison, it is found that the pure incentive model is not applicable to practical conditions, and regulatory incentive model can not only solve practical problems substantially but also outbalance pure incentive model under certain conditions. The research results from example analysis given in this paper offer theoretical instruction and a practical method for effective regulation of banks.

Key words: Inventory financing ,  Asymmetric information ,  Principal-agent ,  Regulatory incentive